![]() ![]() This is consistent with Xinjiang local government statements that emphasize officials must collect data for the IJOP system in a “comprehensive manner” from “everyone in every household.” The system is tracking the movement of people by monitoring the “trajectory” and location data of their phones, ID cards, and vehicles it is also monitoring the use of electricity and gas stations of everybody in the region. Our findings suggest the IJOP system surveils and collects data on everyone in Xinjiang. But most of the other behavior the app considers problematic are ethnic-and religion-neutral. The IJOP app demonstrates that Chinese authorities consider certain peaceful religious activities as suspicious, such as donating to mosques or preaching the Quran without authorization. The app also labels the use of 51 network tools as suspicious, including many Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and encrypted communication tools, such as WhatsApp and Viber. Our analysis also shows that Xinjiang authorities consider many forms of lawful, everyday, non-violent behavior-such as “not socializing with neighbors, often avoiding using the front door”-as suspicious. ![]() Human Rights Watch finds that officials use the IJOP app to fulfill three broad functions: collecting personal information, reporting on activities or circumstances deemed suspicious, and prompting investigations of people the system flags as problematic.Īnalysis of the IJOP app reveals that authorities are collecting massive amounts of personal information-from the color of a person’s car to their height down to the precise centimeter-and feeding it into the IJOP central system, linking that data to the person’s national identification card number. Share this via Facebook Share this via Twitter Share this via WhatsApp Share this via Email Other ways to share Share this via LinkedIn Share this via Reddit Share this via Telegram ![]()
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